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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3) (j ) , Utah Code Ann. (1953,
as amended) .

The case has been assigned to the Court of

Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
aside

Whether or not the trial court erred in setting
the

Schmittroth

judgment
on

entered

February

8,

against
1999,

defendant
pursuant

Connie
to

Rule

60(b)(1) where said defendant took no action after the
entry of final judgment until May 11, 1999, more than
three months after the entry of final judgment.

The

trial court has no discretion to consider the merits of
an untimely motion under Subdivision (b)(1).

Richins v.

Delbert Chipman & Sons,

(Utah App.

1991) .

817 P.2d

382, 387

With respect to an appeal which presents only

questions of law, the trial court's rulings are accorded
no deference and are reviewed for correctness.
Fuel

SUTDPIV V.

Mountain

Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah

1988) .

1

II. Whether or not the trial court erred in setting
aside

the

judgment

Schmittroth

on

entered

February

8,

against
1999,

defendant
pursuant

Connie

to

Rule

60(b)(1) where said defendant failed to show good cause
for her failure to earlier appear and defend the action
and

where

plaintiffs

prejudice thereby.

were

subjected

to

substantial

The appellate court applies an abuse

of discretion standard to review of the trial court's
ruling on the merits of party's motion to set aside a
default judgment or default certificate, and will reverse
the trial court's decision only where it appears that
there

has

been

an

abuse

of

discretion.

Larsen

v.

Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 1984); Pacer Sport &
Cvcle. Inc. v. Mvers. 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975).
III.

Whether or not the trial court erred in its

interpretation of the metes and bounds legal description
contained in a warranty deed.

With respect to findings

of fact, the Trial Court's findings will be upheld unless
the evidence is so completely lacking or so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable

2

or unjust.

Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732

(Utah

1982) .
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann., section 57-1-12.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 26, 1998, Greg and Michele Heuser obtained
a default certificate against Connie Schmittroth.

[R:243]

On the basis of Connie Schmittroth's default, Greg and
Michele

Heuser

entered

all other defendants.
February

8,

into

settlement

agreements

with

[R:375-378, 454-456, 476-477]

1999, Greg

and

Michele

Heuser

default judgment against Connie Schmittroth.

On

obtained

a

[R:450-453]

On May 11, 1999, Connie Schmittroth sought, for the
first time after the entry of final judgment, to have the
default judgment set aside.
submitted

by

considered
pleadings
Argument

the

by

respective

the

appearing
heard

[R:478-485]

Court
in

on July

sides

could

the record

(The pleadings

that may

have

have

included

at

[R:379-511]

29, 1999 has been

been
those
Oral

transcribed.

[R:776]) On September 22, 1999, the Trial Court signed an

3

order setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(1).
On July

[R:533-534]

10, 2000, Greg and Michele Heuser

motion for summary judgment. [R:610-622]

filed a

( The pleadings

filed in support and in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment appear in the record at
The

facts

with

undisputed.

respect

to

the

[R:610-715])

warranty

deed

were

By a minute entry, dated October 2, 2001,

the Trial Court denied

the Heuser's motion

for

summary

judgement on the basis of an analysis which involved an
incorrect

reading

of

the

description.

[R:716-718]

the

its own motion,

error

on

parties have

metes

and

bounds

legal

In fact, the Trial Court made
inasmuch

as none

even so much as suggested

that

the

of

the

legal

description might be read as it was by the Trial Court.
The Heusers then filed a motion for summary judgment
to correct

the error by

(The pleadings
Plaintiffs'
record at

filed

motion

in

for

[R:719-742])

the Trial Court.
support

summary

and

in

judgment

[R:719-732]
opposition

appear

in

to
the

A detailed analysis of the legal

description, measurement by measurement, was provided by

4

the Heusers and uncontested by Connie Schmittroth.
minute

entry,

dated

January

denied the Heuser's motion.

By a

17, 2001, the Trial

Court

[R:743-744]

Because it appeared futile to try the case, in light
of the Trial Court's reading of the legal description,
plaintiff's requested that the Trial Court issue a final
order so that the case could be appealed.

[R: 759-764]

final order was entered February 27, 2001.

[R:765-766]

A

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 17, 1992, Plaintiffs and Appellants Greg and
Michele
appellee

Heuser
Connie

purchased

a

Schmittroth

home
and

from

her

defendant

husband.

and

Connie

Schmittroth and her husband conveyed title to the subject
property

by

means

of

a

warranty

deed

(the

"Warranty

Deed").

The Warranty Deed contained a metes and bounds

legal description of the subject property as follows:
Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West
654.16 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96
feet, South 38 degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89
degrees 8 minutes West 375 feet from the Southeast
corner of Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees
8 minutes West 149.42 fee; thence North 5 degrees
East 325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of
12400 South Street, running East and West; thence
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Easterly along South line of street 124.04 feet;
thence South 38 minutes West 325 feet, more or less,
to the place of beginning.
consisting

of

1.024

acres

(the

''Subject

Property").

[Complaint, paragraph 14; A true and correct copy of the
Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "G".]

[R:10]

Defendants Lee and Carroll Holmstead, owners of the
neighboring

parcel

and prior

grantors

in

the

chain

of

title, claimed that they were the owners of 4709 square
feet

(.108

acres) of the Subject Property

(the "Disputed

Area"),

the location of which is identified as Parcel 2

on

surveyor's

the

[Complaint,

map

attached

paragraph

12;

Counterclaim

of

Defendant

Holmstead

Lee

lawsuit.

as

and

Exhibit

"H";

sought

to

quiet

Connie

Schmittroth

defend

the

title"

failed
of

H."
and

[R.-17-27]

title

to a counterclaim

XX

Answer

Holmstead.]

filed

[Counterclaim of Lee Holmstead.]

Defendant
"warrant

Exhibit

defendant

Disputed Area pursuant

hereto

to

the

in this

[R:17-27]
and refused

Greg

and

to

Michele

Heuser, as required by Utah Code Ann., section 57-1-12.
[Answer

of

defendant

Schmittroth.]

[R:514-532]

virtue of the Warranty Deed, Connie Schmittroth

6

By

(as well

as the other defendants

in the chain of title) owed a

duty to the Heusers to defend their title in the subject
property as warranted and/or to compensate them for their
damages.

Each of the defendants failed and refused to do

so.
Plaintiffs Greg and Michele Heuser sustained general
damages

as

Plaintiffs
damages
with

to

the

Greg

and

consisting

defending

lost

Michele

of:

title

value

the
and

of

the

Heuser

costs

sustained

of

attorney's

special damages in defending title.

Disputed

survey
fees

Area.

special

associated
incurred

as

[R:379-400, 450-453,

775]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Default

judgment was

entered

on February

8, 1999.

The said judgment was the final order in the case.
action was

taken by

the Defendant

for more

than

No

three

months after the entry of default judgment.
On May 11, 1999, the Defendant asked the Court to set
aside the default judgment.

The Trial Court did not have

the jurisdiction pursuant: to Rule 60(b) to set aside the
default

judgment

pursuant

to

7

an untimely motion

under

Rule 60(b)(1).
discretion

Moreover, it was an abuse of the Court's

to set aside the default

judgment without a

showing of good cause on the part of the Defendant and
without considering the prejudice to the Plaintiff which
resulted therefrom.
Plaintiff subsequently moved for summary judgment in
considering

the motion

errored

its reading

in

applied to the case.
qualification

of

the

judgment,

legal

the Court

description

which

The legal description contained a

"more or less" with respect to the length

of the property.
qualifier

for summary

The Trial Court improperly applied the

"more or less"

to the width of the property.

The qualification expressly did not apply to the width of
the property.
boundary
less"

The Court used the qualifier to resolve a

question

far beyond

qualification.

The

the

scope

boundary

of

a

question

"more
at

or

issue

concerned a fence line and a very significant piece of
land.
fence

The warranty deed contained no exception for the
line

in

the habendum

clause

description.

8

following

the

legal

The

default

should be

judgment

reinstated.

entered

on

February

Alternatively,

8,

summary

1999

judgment

should be granted in favor of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
The evidence submitted in support of damages claimed by
Plaintiffs and Appellants included surveys and appraisals
and was undisputed by Defendant.
ARGUMENT
I, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT MORE THAN NINETY DAYS
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provides a
time limit

for filing a motion

to set aside a default

judgment. Rule 60(b) states,
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered to taken.
In

the

indicates
judgment
Defendant
60(b)

present

that
were

the
set

case,
default
aside

Schmittroth's

motion.

February 8, 1999.

The

the

Trial

certificate

pursuant

motion

default

Court's

to

Rule

purports

judgment

and

to

was

order
default

60(b)(1).
be

a

Rule

entered

on

Said judgment was the final order in

9

the case.
1999.

Three months from said date was Monday, May 9,

Defendant

took

no

action

as

to

the

default

judgment until May 11, 1999.
The time limit set by Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional.
Once a defemlt judgment has been entered, it can only be
set aside in accordance with subdivision
Ins. Co. v.

Schettler,

768 P.2d

950

(b).

Arnica Mut.

(Utah App.

1989).

The trial court has no discretion to consider the merits
of an untimely motion under Rule 60(b)(1).

Richins v.

Delbert

(Utah App.

Chipman

& Sons,

817

P.2d

382, 387

1991); Peck v. Cook, 29 Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
WITHOUT A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE AND
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE PREJUDICE TO PLAINTIFFS.
Even
motion

if

to

defendant

set

certificate,

aside

she

Schmittroth
the

failed

default
to

show

had

timely

judgment
good

or

cause

filed

a

default
for

her

failure to earlier file an answer or otherwise appear in
the case.

She knew she was being sued.

she had been

served.

decision

to

not

Yet, she

appear.

intentionally made

Correspondence

10

She knew that

predating

the
the

default judgment proves her knowledge and her proactive
decision not to earlier file an appearance.

Failing to

appear in a legal action has been disapproved by the Utah
Supreme Court as an inappropriate strategy.

The Courts

have been clear that in order to qualify under subsection
(1) , there

must

be

some

evidence

of

actual

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Dixon Ranch Co. , 260 P. 2d 741
is

an

insufficient

excuse

Leasing

(Utah 1953)
to

v.

set

"mistake,
Warren v.

(Illness alone

aside

Houghton,

661

default

judgment.);

Vallev

P.2d

959

(Utah 1983)

(Mere inconvenience is an insufficient excuse

for failing to appear at trial.); Bd. of Educ. of Granite
School Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d
set

aside

a

default

806, 807

judgment,

"the

(Utah 1963)
excuse

must

(To
be

reasonable to constitute excusable neglect" and a default
will not be set aside where the defendant has chosen not
to answer) .

Because a good reason

aside a default,

is required

to set

default should not be set aside where

the defendant has chosen not to answer.

Bd. of Educ. of

Granite School Dist. v. Cox, supra, 384 P.2d 806, 807.

11

The Courts have been clear that a default should not
be set aside where it will result in prejudice to another
party.

Defendant

had

a

chance

to

seek

relief

from

default at a time when no prejudice would have resulted,
but

she chose not

to do so.

Instead, because

of her

conscious strategy in this case, she failed to take any
action until too late.
Setting aside an entry of default or default judgment
is a tool of equity and, therefore, within the discretion
of the Court.

Discretion should be exercised carefully.

Some showing of good cause must be made.
will

result,

default

Westinahouse El. S U P D .

should

not

CO.

Paul W. Larsen Co., Inc.,

V.

544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) ("The
to

favor

granting

relief

from

be

Where prejudice

set

aside.

See

courts generally tend

default

judgments

where

there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in
substantial

prejudice

or

injustice

to

the

adverse

party.")
In

the

defendants

present
entered

understanding

case,

into

Plaintiffs

settlement

and

the

other

agreements with

the

that a default had been in place for more

12

than a year and that plaintiffs would obtain a judgment
against defendant Connie Schmittroth, as well.
been set for January 14, 1999.

Trial had

Defendant Schmittroth had

not appeared in response to the service of process upon
her, despite a default certificate more than one year
old, despite knowledge of the impending trial date, and
despite an invitation extended to her to participate in
mediation.

It was a virtual certainty that she would not

be able to have her default set aside.
Plaintiffs

were

highly

prejudiced

when

defendant

Connie Schmittroth's default was set aside, because their
position

as

to

the

significantly changed.

other

defendants

had

already

Plaintiffs no longer were able to

obtain a complete recovery without relitigating the case
with

defendant

Connie

Schmittroth.

Schmittroth

filed

Additionally,

a purported

a

defendant

counterclaim

against defendants Lee and Carroll Holmstead.
In contrast, Defendant Schmittroth never did provide
the Trial Court with any indication of good cause for her
failure to earlier appear or participate in any way with
the ongoing litigation.
13

III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED,

Where

the

pleadings

undisputed

facts

which

controversy

as a matter

and

permit
of

affidavits
the

disclose

resolution

of

a

law, the moving party is

entitled to summary judgment with respect to that matter.
Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure, Rule

56;

Aired Ins.

Aaencv v. Zions First Nat.Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
The pleadings and discovery responses of defendant
Connie Schmittroth establish that she conveyed title to
the

Subject

Property

to plaintiffs

Heuser by the Warranty Deed.
under

obligation

property

to

described,

and

Michele

As a matter of law, she is

plaintiffs
as

Greg

provided

with
by

respect
Utah

to

Code

the

Ann. ,

section 57-1-12.
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 requires the grantor
executing

a

warranty

deed

to

convey

the

property

described therein free and clear of other claims and to
warranty that the property is the grantor's to convey.
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 also requires the grantor
to appear and defend the title to the property in the
name

of

the

grantee.

The written
14

contract

between

defendant Connie Schmittroth and the plaintiffs contained
the

same

requirements

to convey

ownership

by

warranty

deed free of the above-described claims.
Connie

Schmittroth

failed and refused

and defend title" pursuant

to

"warranty

to the warranty deed and as

required by Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12.
Section 57-1-12 provides:
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the
following form: WARRANTY DEED [form provided].
Such
deed when executed as required by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee,
his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named,
together with all the appurtenances, rights and
privileges thereunto belonging, with covenants from
the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives,
that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he
has good right to convey the same; that he guarantees
the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet
possession thereof; that the premises are free from
all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and
personal representatives will forever warrant and
defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs
and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever.
Any exceptions to such covenants may be inserted in
such deed following the description of the land.
By defendant Connie Schmittroth's
the

title

of

Greg

described

in

the

Michele

and

Michele

Warranty

Heuser were

Heuser

Deed,

damaged.

15

failure to defend
in

the

plaintiffs

Greg

property
Greg

and Michele

and

Heuser

were deprived of title to part of the land described in
the Warranty Deed, they were damaged in an amount equal
to the value
Disputed
estate

of

the Disputed Area.

Area was
appraisal

established
of

David

by

Van

The value

of

the

the uncontested
Drimmelen,

MAI,

real
dated

October 29, 1998.
In an action
title,
incurred

the
as

for breach

plaintiff
special

parties concerning
P.2d 703, 708-09
Pack, 765 P.2d

is

of

the warranty

entitled

damages

title.

in

to

to

defend

attorneys

litigation

with

fees
third

See Gillmor v. Cumminas, 904

(Utah App. 1995); South Sanoitch Co. v.
1279, 1283

(Utah App. 1988).

Under the

third-party litigation rule, the costs and attorneys fees
incurred

by

the

Heusers

in dealing

with

defendant

Lee

Holmstead and Kevin Fitzgerald are compensable as special
damages.
Special

Brewer v.
damages

in

Peatross, 595 P.2d

866

this

of

case

consist

(Utah 1979).
the

costs

of

survey associated with defending title and attorney's fees
incurred as special damages.
In an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff may
recover attorneys fees if provided by the contract.

16

The

contract between Connie Schmittroth and plaintiffs was the
standard Real Estate Purchase Contract which contains such
an attorneys fee provision.

Plaintiffs are also entitled

to their costs.
Summary Judgment

should have been granted

against

defendant Connie Schmittroth as to her breach of warranty.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
METES AND BOUNDS LEGAL DESCRIPTION.

The Warranty Deed speaks for itself.

It contains a

legal description, describing the legal boundaries of the
property conveyed.
In

response

to

Plaintiff!s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, the Trial Court issued a minute entry dated
October 2, 2000.

The Trial Court erred in its reading of

the legal description.
With regard to the length of the property, the legal
description states that the measurement of the length is
325 feet, more or less, to the South boundary of 12400
South Street, as well as 325 feet, more or less, from
12400

South

according

to

the

point

of

beginning.

Therefore,

to the legal description, the length of the
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property is approximately 325 feet.

The Heusers would not

be able to sue the Defendants if the distance from one end
of the property to 12400 South Street was slightly
than 325 feet.

However, this is not the boundary of the

property which is in dispute.
is in dispute.

less

The width of the property

With regard to the width, the Defendants

did not qualify the metes and bounds measurements with the
term

"more

or

less."

The

width

of

the

property

is

warranted without any exception.
A copy of the surveyor's map, including the specific
references

to

the

property

provided

to

the

Trial

analysis

of

the

surveyors

boundary

Court.

The

measurements

following

depiction

of

the

was

detailed
property

measurements was also provided to the Trial Court.
The

legal

description

to

the warranty

deed

is

as

follows:
Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West
654.16 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96
feet, South 38 degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89
degrees 8 minutes West 375 feet from the Southeast
corner of Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 8
minutes West 149.42 feet; thence North 5 degrees East
325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of 12400
South Street, running East and West; thence Easterly
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along South line of street 124.04 feet; thence South
38 degrees West 325 feet, more or less, to the place
of beginning.
There

are

a

total

of

nine

points

shown

on

the

surveyor's map referenced in the legal description.

The

location of those points were numbered on the surveyor's
map for convenience of reference for the Trial Court.

The

language describing the borders of the property was also
highlighted on the surveyors map to allow the Trial Court
to

quickly

identify

the

sides

of

the

property

being

measured by each element of the legal description.
The

point

numbered

1 on

the

surveyors

map

is

the

surveyors monument from which the location of the property
is

calculated.

description
Township

3

as

This
the

South,

Meridian.

The

description

take us

is

referred

Southeast
Range

first

1

four

from

to

corner

East,

in
of

Salt

measurements

the monument

the

legal

Section

Lake

Base

in

the

to the

30,
and
legal

Southeast

corner of the property.
Point

2 as marked

on the surveyors map

is a point

North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 654.16 feet from point 1.
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This

measurement

is

the

first

phrase

in

the

legal

description.
Point 3 is a point North 89 degrees 8 minutes West
769.96

feet

from point

2.

This

is

the

second

clause

contained in the legal description.
Point 4 is a point South 38 minutes West 41.79 feet
from point

3.

This

is

the

third

clause

in

the

legal

description.
Point 5 is a point North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 375
feet from point 4.
description.
monument.

The

This is the fourth clause in the legal
fifth

clause

is

the

reference

to

the

The fifth point is the Southeast corner of the

property.
The sixth point marked on the surveyors map is a point
North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 149.42 feet from point 5.
This

is

property.

the

first

measurement

the

distance

the

width

of

the

It does not contain any exception such as the

language "more or less."
that

of

Defendants
from

the

Therefore, it must be concluded

warranted

corner

of

to

the

Heusers

the property

Street was 149.42 feet, without exception.
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to

that
600

the
East

Incidentally,

the

point

exception.

of

beginning

is

also

warranted

without

Since the fence line in dispute is on the East

side of the property, rather than the West

side of the

property where 600 East Street is located, even if there
was a reference to "more or less" on the legal description
for the width of the property,

it would only allow for

variation in the location of 600 East Street and not for
the East boundary line of the property.
the Defendants

could

have

stated

an

The only way that
exception

for

the

fence line was to actually mention the fence line in the
habendum clause following the granting clause of the legal
description.1

This

is

also

the

only

way

that

the

Defendants could have avoided committing fraud against the
Heusers in conveying the property to them.
Point 7 is a point North 5 degrees East 325.5 feet,
more or less,
The words

to the South line of 12400 South Street.

"more or

less"

refers

1

to the fact that

the

The Trial Court was provided with a copy of the Black's
Law Dictionary definition for the meaning of the term
"More or Less". The term is only properly used for slight
or unimportant inaccuracies.
See further discussion of
applicable case law below.
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South boundary of 12400 South Street might be less than
325.5 feet.

Since the location of 12400 South Street is

not an issue in this litigation, the reference to "more or
less" is irrelevant to this litigation.
Point 8 on the surveyors map is a point Easterly along
the South line of 12400 South Street 124.04 feet.
another measurement
measurement

takes

This is

of the width of the property.

the measurer

to a point

14.6 feet past the fence in question.

approximately

Again, there is no

exception with regard to this measurement.

The Defendants

have warranted all of this property to the Heusers.
must defend

This

They

the Heusers' title in this property without

exception.
The point marked 9 on the surveyors map is the same as
the point marked 5 on the surveyors map.
minutes

West

beginning.
any

325

reflect

measurement

or

less,

to

the point

of

Again, the words "more or less," do not create

exception

simply

feet, more

It is South 3 8

of

as

to

the
the

the width
exception
length

of

of

the property.

stated

as

They

to

the

other

the property.

In

other

words, if the earlier measurement of the length property
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required less than 325.5 feet to reach 12400 South, then
the return measurement must also be adjusted

accordingly

to reach the specifically stated point of beginning.
point of beginning is not in question.

The

Instead, only the

distance from the point of beginning to point 8 is subject
to the exception created by the words "more or less."
On the surveyor's map the letters A and B were written
to indicate the location of the plus and minus sign used
by

the surveyor

to reference

the

"more or less"

phrase

used in the deed.
The surveyor also wrote the word

"parcel 2" with an

arrow indicating the portion of the property between the
fence

line

property.

in

question

and

the

East

boundary

Parcel 2 is the property in dispute.

of

the

From this

depiction, the Trial Court should have been able to see
that the problem created by the fence was a problem as to
the width of the property, not the length of the property.
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 permits a grantor to
state

any

following

exceptions
the

to

description

the
of

covenants

the

land.

permitted by Utah Code Ann., Section
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of

warranty

The

exception

57-1-12

should

be

stated in the habendum clause which follows the granting
clause of the legal description.
Estates

See Dansie v. Hi Country

Homeowners, 987 P.2d 30 (Utah 1999).

v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183

In Hancock

(Utah 1990), cited by

the Court, the deed actually referred to the fence line in
the habendum clause, as permitted by Section 57-7-12.

In

the instant case, Defendants did not do so.
As the Trial Court noted, none of the prior warranty
deeds

used

by

the

Defendants

to

convey

the

property

contained an exception using the words "more or less" to
excuse themselves from liability relative to the location
of

12400

warranted

South.

When Ms. Schmittroth

the properties

to the Heuser,

and her

husband

the creator

of

their deed was clever enough to insert this language for
the first time to limit their exposure to any claim based
on the location of the street.
Conversely, Defendants have never mentioned the fence
line or mentioned any exception for the fence line or for
any measurement
West width.
obligations

of the property concerning

its East and

The Defendants must be required to meet the
created by Utah Code Ann., Section
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57-1-12.

They failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to
state an exception for the fence or for the East and West
measurements.

Interestingly, their failure to make an

exception as to the fence line has occurred in the very
same

deed

covering

in which
the

they

location

astutely

of

the

added

street.

an

exception

Clearly,

the

Defendants did not intend to create an exception for the
fence line.

It must be the inescapable conclusion of this

Court

the parties

that

boundary

of

the

intended

property

as

to warrant
stated

in

the
the

East
legal

description.
The foregoing conclusions are substantiated by the
testimony offered by the Heusers in this case.

As the

Trial Court noted in its minute entry, they have testified
that the property boundary was the topic of discussion
prior to the closing.

If the Defendants had attempted to

place an exception for the fence line in the warranty deed
following that discussion, the Heusers would have refused
to close on the sale of the property without a survey.
This was a conscious decision that they made prior to
their purchase of the property, based on the information
25

about legal descriptions which Mr. Penman had discussed
with them when Mr. Penman purchased their former home.
Since

the

Defendants

chose

to

warranty

the

property

without any exception for the fence line, there was not a
need for a survey prior to closing.

The Heusers followed

the course of action which they intended at closing, which
was to address the location of the fence with the neighbor
after the closing.

After failing to resolve the situation

with the neighbor, the Heusers availed themselves of their
rights under Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should issue an order requiring
the

Trial

Court

to

reinstate

the

Default

Judgment.

Alternatively the Court of Appeals should order the Trial
Court

to grant Plaintiff's motion summary judgment and

enter an award of damages consistent with the uncontested
evidence submitted by Plaintiffs.
DATED this JSL day of June, 2001.

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Thor B. Roundy
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Bar No. 6435
I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this "7%'
day of
June, 2001, I served a copy of the attached BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANTS, Trial Court No. 960906139, Appellate Court No.
20010250-CA, upon counsel for the appellee in this matter
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
John L. McCoy
10 West Broadway, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
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Thi.d Judicial District
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Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435)
Counsel for Plaintiffs
230 South 500 East, Suite 270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Facsimile (801) 364-8815

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREG HEUSER and MICHELE
HEUSER, individuals,

DEFAULT

CERTIFICATE

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 960906139

LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN
FITZGERALD, CONNIE
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD,
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN
HOLMSTEAD, individuals,

Judge William A. Thome

Defendants.

The Default of defendant CONNIE SCHMITTROTH (AKA Connie
Gardner) is hereby entered in the above-captioned matter.

Said

defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on
October 24, 1997.

Said defendant has failed to file an Answer

thereto within the time reqoiDATED this ^Jfa

day of,.
,- • -' ?i

(

/??r
. , :<2dSTRICT COURT CLERK

c<%^ tf, //

G0>
HP
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435)
Counsel for Plaintiffs
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Facsimile (801) 364-4721

Deputy Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREG HEUSER and MICHELE
HEUSER, individuals,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER OF JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT CONNIE
SCHMITTROTH

v.

Civil No. 960906139

LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN
FITZGERALD, CONNIE
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD,
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN
HOLMSTEAD, individuals,

Judge William A. Thome

OATC

Defendants.
Based upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgement, and the
evidence submitted in support thereof, and further based upon the
Default Certificate executed by the Clerk of the Court on January
26, 1998 and for good cause appearing therein, Default Judgment is
hereby ORDERED as against Defendant Connie Schmittroth as follows:
1.

The Court finds that on June 17, 1992 Defendant Connie

Schmittroth conveyed by Warranty Deed the following described
property in Salt Lake County, Utah to plaintiffs:

Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 654.16
feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96 feet, South 38
degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West
375 feet from the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 3
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence
North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 149.42 fee; thence North 5
degrees East 325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of
12400 South Street, running East and West; thence Easterly
along South line of street 124.04 feet; thence South 38
minutes West 325 feet, more or less, to the place of
beginning.
(the "Subject Property")
2.

The Court finds that the following described portion of

the Subject Property was at the time occupied by the defendants
Lee and Carroll Holmstead:
Beginning at the fence corner which is located North 626.72
feet and West 589.09 feet from the Southeast Corner of
Section 30, Township 3 South/ Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, thence North 1 degree 03 minutes 07 seconds
East 307.86 feet more or less to the South line of 12400
South Street; thence East 14.16 feet along said South line;
thence South 0 degrees 38 minutes 00 seconds West 308.53 feet
more or less to an East-West fence line; thence North 87
degrees 34 minutes 16 seconds West 16.41 feet along said
Fence line to the point of beginning. Contains 4709 sq. ft.
(the "Disputed Property.")
3.

The Court finds that Defendant Connie Schmittroth,

breached the warranty to convey and the warranty to defend title
and orders that Plaintiffs are entitled to general damages in the
amount of $9,300.00 as the fair market value of the Disputed
Property.

Heuser/Default Jx
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4.

The Court finds that Defendant Connie Schmittroth

breached the warranty to defend said title and caused Plaintiff's
to incur additional damages in litigation as to title and orders
that Plaintiffs are entitled to special damages in the amounts of
$600.00 for the costs of survey associated with defending title;
and $12,110.00 with regard to attorney's fees incurred as special
damages in defending title against third-party claims as of
December 30, 1998.
5.

The Court orders Defendant Connie Schmittroth to pay

costs incurred in this action in the amounts of $170.00 with
regard to the filing of the case,$12.00 with regard to service of
process upon Defendant Connie Schmittroth, and $63 0.45 as to
depositions taken in the matter.
6.

Attorney's fees incurred in litigation as against

Defendant Connie Schmittroth are awarded in the amount of $250.00
as of December 30, 1998.
7.

Judgement is rendered herein in the total amount of

$23,072.45, which may be augmented hereafter to reflect damages
sustained after December 30, 1998.

Post-judgment interest shall

accrue on this judgment at the legal rate until paid.
8.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to the costs of collection,

including reasonable attorney's fees, with regard to the
collection of this judgment.
Heuser/Default.Jx
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DATED this

&

day of

^

*? •-••--.

1999.

BY THE COURT^ \

Third^ Di^fc^fit Judge

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT
CONNIE SCHMITTROTH, by United States mail, postage prepaid, this £1
day of January, 1999, to the following:
Connie Gardner(AKA Connie Schmittroth)
2495 North 800 West
Provo, Utah 84604
-^~~'''CsT^t

Heuser/Default Jx
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Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435)
Counsel for Plaintiffs
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Facsimile (801) 364-4721
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREG HEUSER and MICHELE
HEUSER, individuals,

:

Plaintiffs,

ORDER SETTING ASIDE
DEFAULT

:

v.

:

Civil No. 960906139

LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN
FITZGERALD, CONNIE
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD,
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN
HOLMSTEAD, individuals,

:

Judge William A. Thorne

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

Based on the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b)(1),
the default judgment against Connie Schmittroth entered February
12, 1999 and the default certificate entered January 26, 1998 are
hereby set aside.
The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the default
judgment

on February

8,

1999, the Court was

unaware

that

Plaintiff's motion for default judgment was opposed by Defendant
Connie Schmittroth.

Dated this <y ^

day of^August, 1999

Third Di^rlfc'i-'XIourt - .">_'

„

^

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order Setting Aside Default, by
United States mail, postage prepaid, this
^fH^> day of August,
1999, to the following:
John L. McCoy
310 South Main Street, Suite 1314
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREG HEUSER,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs

Case No: 960906139

LEE HOLMSTEAD,
Defendant.

Judge: L. A. DEVER
Date: 10/02/2000

Clerk: debbiep
The Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" has come before this
court pursuant to Rule 4-501. This matter involves a boundary
dispute. The Plaintiff's purchased the subject property via a
warranty deed from Defendants Kevin Fitzgerald and Connie
Schmittroth. Prior to the purchase, the Plaintiff's asked Kevin,
Connie's ex-husband, if the fence was the proper boundary line.
According to the Plaintiff's testimony, "he said no, its somewhere,
and waived his hand back and forth in here." (Greg Heuser's
deposition). A year after the sale, the Plaintiffs hired a
surveyor and learned that the fence was encroaching on 0.108 acres
of their property. Since the Plaintiffs were unable to reach an
agreement with their neighbors, this action pursued. The
Plaintiffs argue that the metes and bounds description in the
warranty deed is controlling and therefore that they own the
disputed parcel. In this motion, the Plaintiff's argue that the
Defendant, Connie Schmittroth, has failed to warrant and defend
their title pursuant to U.C. A. 57-1-12. Therefore, they claim she
is liable for breach of warranty and damages. However, the latter
statute provides that "any exceptions to such covenants may be
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the
land." Here Connie (and Kevin) did exactly what the statute
authorizes. She made an exception to her covenants for quiet
possession and freedom from encumbrances when following the metes
and bounds description she inserted the exception "more or less."
None of the prior warranty deeds used by the Defendants to convey
the property contained this language. Here, the fence was erected
prior to Kevin and Connie's ownership of the property. Since Kevin
was unsure of the location of legal boundary line, he notified the
Plaintiffs of the possibility of an encumbrance. Then Kevin and
Connie inserted the "more or less" provision into the warranty
deed. The warranty deed passes all the right, title and interest

Case No: 960906139
Date:
Oct 02, 2000
the grantor has in the property. Therefore, the Plaintiffs did
receive a conveyance in fee simple. However, the "more or less"
language in the warranty deed insulates the grantors, Connie and
Kevin, from liability under U.C.A. 57-1-12. See Hancock v. Planned
Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185-186 (Utah 1990). Therefore
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This Minute

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 960906139 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this 3

day of

M±

NAME
JOHN L. MCCOY
ATTORNEY DEF
10 West Broadway
Suite 310
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
THOR B ROUNDY
ATTORNEY PLA
275 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 150
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841020000
2 0^g)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREG HEUSER,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.

Case No: 960906139

LEE HOLMSTEAD,
Defendant

Judge: L. A. DEVER
Date: 01/17/2001

Clerk: rayd
The Plaintiff's Motion to Correct the Decision in Minute Entry and
for Summary Judgment has come before the Court pursuant to Rule
4-501. The Court, having considered Plaintiff's motion and after
having reviewed the memoranda in support and in opposition thereof,
hereby DENIES Petitioner's Motion. This Minute Entry shall
constitute the final order of the Court on the. matters presented
herein.

Case No: 960906139
Date:
Jan 17, 2001
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 960906139 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN
ATTORNEY DEF
3 9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SUITE 100
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84111-2705
RONALD E. KUNZ
ATTORNEY DEF
8701 SOUTH 1300 WEST
WEST JORDAN UT 84088
JOHN L. MCCOY
ATTORNEY DEF
10 West Broadway
Suite 310
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
THOR B ROUNDY
ATTORNEY DEF
275 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 150
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841020000

day of

Deputy Court /.Clerk

S^r-^

Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 643 5)
Counsel for Plaintiffs
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Facsimile (801) 364-4721

Third JUL!"!*,! District

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREG HEUSER and MICHELE
HEUSER, individuals,

:

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960906139
v.
LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN
FITZGERALD, CONNIE
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD,
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN
HOLMSTEAD, individuals,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:

Judge Dever

:

Based on the Motion for Order of Final Dismissal, dated
January 29, 2 0 01, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED
as follows:
1.

On October 2, 2000, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion

for Summary Judgment, which opinion suggests that Plaintiffs will
not prevail in any trial in the above-captioned action.
2.

Based on the motion dated January 29, 2001, it appearing

that the parties wish to take no further action in this matter,
subject only to the Plaintiffs' right of appeal.
3.

Therefore, good cause appearing, the Motion for Order of

Final Dismissal is hereby granted, and the remaining claims in the

above-captioned action are hereby dismissed.
DATED this

day of February, 2001.

rt Judge
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, by United States mail,
postage prepaid, this
ff^ day of February, 2001, to the
following:
John L. McCoy
10 West Broadway, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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HIH* B RgID UTAH CO RECORDER BY HB
1990 NOV 13 11257 All FEE 7 . 0 0
RECORDED FOR PROVO ABSTRACT COMPANY

Recorded at Request of.
at

M. Fee Paid*. Dep. Book.

Mail tax notice t o .

.Pace.
A,Mr»«.

GRANTEE .

. Ref.:

2 4 9 5 North 8 5 0 Went, PROVO, UTAH
84604

WARRANTY DEED
of
CONVEY

E . J . WlrMER and DEBRA WIMMER, husband and w i f e
PROVO
, County of
UTAH
and WARRANT to

grantor
.State of Utah, hereby

ERIC W. GARDNER

of

KWVO' UTAH
TEW DOLLARS AM) OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS

the following described tract
Stilte of Utah:

UTAH

of land in

grantee
for the sum of
00K*NI8?c
Count>.

All of Lot 3, Plat "B-, WOOD HOLLOW ESTATES SUBDIVISION,
Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof on
file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
Subject to Easements and Restrictions of record.
The Grantee herein agrees to assume and pay the existing balance
of a certain Trust Deed executed by E. J. WTMMER and DEBRA WIMMER,
HUSBAND AND WIFE, Trustor, in favor of PROVO ABSTRACT COMPANY, INC.
Trustee, and FAR WEST BANK, Beneficiary, in the principal amount of
82,053.00, Dated 10/12/1989, Recorded 10/17/1989, as Entry No.
31317, in Book 2636, at Page 45, of Official Records. FAR WEST
BANK hereby appoints ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Successor Trustee and hereby assigns to ZIONS MORTGAGE COMPANY,The
Foregoing Trust Deed, said assignment Dated 10/23/1889, Recorded
1/30/1990, as Entry No. 2923, in Book 2661, at Page 762, of Official
Records.
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57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the
following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the
premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
, 19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the
grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances,
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises;
that he has good right to convey the same; that he
guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the
quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his
heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his
heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be

57-1-13
briefly inserted in such deed following the description
of the land.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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